



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

degree of system, of individual good judgment, of coolness in emergencies, that we at home but faintly understand.

Notable for clearness and breadth of view, this treatise of Lieutenant Colonel Azan's is by no means lacking in precise facts; and the details are filled in from precious experience—experience gained at the expense of toil, and danger, and bloodshed. There is not a single fact in the book, however, which does not contribute to an understanding of the military problem as a whole. Moreover, always alert to prevent misconceptions, the author guards as carefully against over-dependence upon principle as against misleading emphasis upon particulars. He shows us the difference between red tape and real efficiency in the presence of an active enemy; he makes us see what the work of an officer really is.

If anyone still cherishes the secret hope that this war may be won almost any day merely through some extraordinary stroke of luck, or some strategic inspiration, or some sudden outburst of valor, on our side, or through some oversight on the part of the enemy, this book should bring him to a more practical frame of mind and a sterner resolution; for it reveals in a very striking and convincing way the real magnitude and complexity of the task that our American armies must help to accomplish. Of very great interest in this connection are the author's observations on the training of troops in America—a subject upon which Lieutenant Colonel Azan is qualified to speak with authority: it is to be hoped that his advice has not come too late to be of use in the present crisis. More than any exhortation, this book of tested theory and grim, practical war-wisdom will prove stimulating to Americans—both soldiers and civilians—because it tells just what is involved in the military task we have undertaken.

EUROPE'S FATAL HOUR. By Guglielmo Ferrero. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1918.

Superficial people assume that when the Teutonic Powers have once been completely defeated, international crime will have been effectually discouraged for the future, and progress will continue uninterruptedly along the old lines. Thoughtful people are not contented with so easy an optimism. They see, in the first place, that it will be extremely difficult to ensure peace and progress by any new political devices or by any redistribution of territory. In the second place, they see that the hope of the world lies in a revision of ideals: there must be an ethical change.

This change is even now going on. It seems clear that after this war is over men will find that their whole attitude toward life has altered. Not only will they look upon large questions with new eyes, but they will feel a difference in their subconscious reactions, their impulses, their ideals. The lesson learned from the war will be formulated in a thousand different ways. Emphasis will be laid anew upon "efficiency" and "preparedness"; peace will be extolled as never before; progress will be re-defined. But what is the great underlying lesson that we are to learn?

This is the question that Ferrero, the historian of ancient Rome, has set himself to answer in his book, *Europe's Fateful Hour*. He finds the solution of the problem in a very simple principle, derived from his study of antiquity.

Common sense and common conscience have always taught men that blessings limit one another; but the spirit of man revolts against limitations. Man is extreme even in his virtues; he builds towers of Babel; he is wise overmuch. Sometimes for brief periods there is wise living. The earlier Puritans, for example, had a large measure of sweet reasonableness; they loved God and did not despise life. But the later Puritans tended to sour fanaticism. We, their descendants, have reacted against the extreme of moral rigor; we have made the discovery that it is possible to be good without being dismal; but we have not reverted to the orderliness and equable force of Colonel Hutchinson and his fellows. On the contrary, it is easy, at least for our young people, to believe that it is possible to combine irresponsibility and "efficiency," to be entirely care-free and perfectly good. We want *both* extremes. Our rich men set no limits to their wealth, or to their philanthropy. They do not know when to stop getting money, or when to cease building libraries and endowing charities.

These are small illustrations. Everywhere may be seen the conflict between the ideal of quantity and that of quality, between power and perfection, between Romanticism and Classicism. Everywhere one may perceive the effort to achieve a paradoxical reconciliation of opposite extremes. The world has hoped to secure peace by preparing for war; it has tried to admire all ideals equally and has pursued contradictory aims with unexampled energy. "Our age desired power, but it also desired, in all sincerity, character, equity, justice, truth, good. It was easily angered if any one doubted of these virtues. Unfortunately, if it wanted these blessings, it was not the less constrained, by dominating passions and interests, to sacrifice them daily to its desire for riches and power."

Of the ideals of quality and perfection, the Latin races are the traditional custodians; and although these nations themselves have indulged not a little in the sin of immoderation and power-worship, the great overturners and breakers-down of the classic ideals of civilization and morals have been the Germans. They have, for one thing, perverted classical scholarship. Imitating their example, the rest of the world, before the war, had fallen into the way of regarding the classics as thorny sciences; and it was in a way to lose the true message of Greece and Rome. But the tendency to transform or altogether to disparage the study of the classics is, of course, but a striking symptom of a general disease—a disease that had originated in all countries at the same time, but that had taken firmest hold upon Germany.

Other peoples admire the *great*; Germany, the colossal. "The great is pure quality, whereas the colossal is quality with a large admixture of quantity. Stern intellectual discipline and humility are absolutely essential not only for the creation of the great, but also for its right understanding and appreciation. The colossal, on the contrary, is one of the myriad forms of human vanity and is readily

understood and admired even by minds of coarser fibre, wholly devoid of education." It is based upon a sort of false mysticism which seeks the infinite in vagueness, in the absence of limitation, in boundless and grandiose desires.

But is not the secret of German success precisely that sense of order which is claimed as the especial possession of the Latin races? It is necessary to be clear on this point. Ferrero answers without hesitation, No. Order is not simply organization. Order is above all "the sense of the limits which a society ought not to overpass if it does not wish to see reason transform itself into folly, truth transform itself into error, beauty transform itself into ugliness, and good transform itself into evil."

Ferrero's fundamental idea is simple enough—so simple, indeed, that it would seem scarcely to require two hundred and fifty pages of print for its explication. The treatise is indeed prolix and eloquent rather than concise and analytical. Its central idea, however, appears to be as profound as it is simple, and its implications are wide and deep. To have stated the idea clearly, to have called attention arrestingly to the extent of its possible meaning—this is no mean achievement. Ferrero seems to have outlined a great and vital truth—a truth that is perhaps very close to *the* truth. There is something wholesome and inspiring in his exhortation to the world to return to the worship of that God who is "the august guardian of measure."

PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE. By William Harbutt Dawson. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918.

When a crime is committed by an individual the ethical sense of mankind demands the punishment of the criminal. Revenge, it is true, is not the animus; but punishment is punishment—and it involves restraint and privation. Is there any reason why the same logic should not be applied to nations? To this question William Harbutt Dawson replies, in effect, that if it is out of the question to indict a whole nation, it is even more impracticable to punish a whole nation.

In a sense Germany is even now being punished. She is sustaining enormous losses on the battlefield—making bloody sacrifices in a cause which, if she ever learns the truth, will fill her soul with loathing. At home her people are said to be upon the verge of starvation. The judgment of history will be against her—and age-long infamy in the sight of the whole world is no light matter. Yet all this does not seem to be enough. Germany, we say in our hearts, is a criminal, and she should be punished as criminals are punished.

Thus it appears that for the majority of men the ideas of justice and retaliation are almost inextricably intermixed. And history hardly furnishes a precedent to show the world how to deal with an international crime so monstrous, so deliberately premeditated, as that which Germany has perpetrated. Such is the ethical problem. The answer certainly cannot be given by a purely pacifist philosophy; indignation, even when it is righteous, may be a poor counselor; and so perhaps we cannot do better than listen to the warnings of caution and common sense.